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Reckless Manslaughter 
 
Findlay Stark* 
 
“Reckless manslaughter” (RM) apparently covers situations where: (i) the defendant’s act or 
omission caused the death of another person; (ii) the defendant was aware at the time of acting 
or omitting that a risk of death or serious injury existed; and (iii) the relevant risk was taken 
without adequate justification.1 The word “apparently” is necessary because very few writers 
think that RM exists uncontroversially in contemporary English law.2 The more common view 
is that the existence of a distinct head of involuntary manslaughter called “reckless 
manslaughter” is controversial.3 On this view, RM can merely be assumed to exist alongside 
the more established forms of involuntary manslaughter: unlawful act manslaughter (UAM) 
and gross negligence manslaughter (GNM). Hedged bets are thus common: “There may be a 
crime of reckless manslaughter”;4 “it seems clear that causing death by recklessness is a form 
of manslaughter in its own right”;5 “cases of so-called ‘reckless manslaughter’”.6 Some sources 
avoid the hedging of bets by simply omitting reference to RM as a distinct type of involuntary 
manslaughter, one example being the recent Sentencing Council consultation on manslaughter.7 
Caution is necessary. If reported appellate decisions are anything to go by, few prosecutors 
                                                
* Thanks to James Chalmers, Henry Mares, David Ormerod QC, Nicky Padfield, Jonathan Rogers and Andrew 
Simester for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Risks of serious bodily harm are always assumed to be within the ambit of RM, presumably because it is meant 
to have stemmed from murder. 
2 RM is assumed to exist in V. Tadros, “The limits of manslaughter” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), 
Criminal Liability for Non-aggressive Death (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.40; W. Wilson, “Dealing with drug-
induced homicide” in the same collection, pp.178-179; C.M.V. Clarkson, “Context and culpability in involuntary 
manslaughter: principle or instinct?” in A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell (eds.), Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.148. See, also, O. Quick, “Prosecuting (gross) medical negligence: 
manslaughter, discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service” (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 421, 422. 
3 E.g. D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), pp.644-645; A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s 
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), pp.422-423; J. Rogers, “The Law 
Commission’s proposed restructure of homicide” (2006) 70 J. Crim. L. 223, 227; B. Mitchell and R.D. Mackay, 
“Investigating involuntary manslaughter: an empirical study of 127 cases” (2011) 31 O.J.L.S. 165, 165-166. 
4 J. Herring, Criminal Law, 10th edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017), p.160 (emphasis added). 
5 J. Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, 8th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.302 
(emphasis added). 
6 Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com. No.304, 2006), para. 1.14 (emphasis added); see too paras. 
2.161, 3.54. The Commission had earlier proposed an offence of “reckless killing”: see Involuntary Manslaughter 
(Law Com. No.237, 1996); Home Office, Reforming the Law on Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government’s 
Proposals (2000) and Involuntary Homicide Bill (2000), cl. 1(1). 
7  Manslaughter Guideline Consultation (Sentencing Council, 2017), 7 (identifying only gross negligence 
manslaughter and unlawful act manslaughter as species of involuntary manslaughter). See, too, W. Wilson, 
Criminal Law, 6th edn (Harlow: Person, 2017), p.393. 
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argue their case in terms of RM,8 presumably because it will be more straightforward (and 
reliable) to secure a conviction for UAM or GNM.9 The appellate courts have thus had virtually 
nothing to say about RM. 
The first parts of this paper explain briefly how this uncertainty arose. RM is assumed 
to have emerged as the mens rea of murder contracted from the 1960s onwards. Beyond this 
assumption, the authority for the existence of RM rests almost exclusively10 on one unreported 
case – Lidar.11 It will be argued that Lidar is more consistent with the previous authorities on 
GNM than with a distinct category of advertence-based involuntary manslaughter covering the 
unjustified and advertent taking of risks of death or serious harm that results in death. With 
Lidar explained in such terms, there will be good reason to doubt that a distinct head of RM 
exists as a matter of doctrine in contemporary English law. The advertent taking of an 
unjustified risk with regard to causing serious bodily harm or death might merely be an element 
of the base crime in UAM, or a factor that might justify a finding of gross negligence in GNM. 
There are very few imaginable cases where RM would be needed to convict the defendant of 
manslaughter, and in these cases it will be contended that it is unclear if manslaughter is a 
competent verdict, or merely (intuitively) ought to be. 
The combination of the breadth of UAM and GNM, and the difficulty of thinking up 
convincing examples of where only RM could secure a conviction for manslaughter, has led 
RM to be viewed as “primarily of academic interest only”.12 In the final section of this paper, 
it will be contended that this is unfortunate. Having a properly-established head of RM would 
bring significant benefits in terms of fair labelling, fair sentencing, and increased hope for a 
fairer law of homicide, particularly (but not exclusively) if manslaughter were broken up into 
discrete offences of homicide. 
  
The Arguments for the Existence of Reckless Manslaughter 
                                                
8  Mackay and Mitchell identified 15 cases of “reckless manslaughter” – this was, it appears, the author’s 
classification (the methodological basis of which is unclear): B. Mitchell and R.D. Mackay, “Investigating 
involuntary manslaughter: an empirical study of 127 cases” (2011) 31 O.J.L.S. 165, 181. 
9 J. Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 7th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.278. 
10 cf. Hussain [2012] EWCA Crim 188, [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 75, explained below. 
11 Unreported, Court of Appeal, 11 November 1999 [2000] 4 Arch News 3. Mitchell and Mackay’s “Case 20” is 
alleged to be a case where the defendants pleaded guilty to “reckless manslaughter” in relation to facts similar to 
those in Hyam v DPP [1975] A.C. 55 (discussed below): B. Mitchell and R.D. Mackay, “Investigating involuntary 
manslaughter: an empirical study of 127 cases” (2011) 31 O.J.L.S. 165, 171. As noted below, the facts of Hyam 
are nowadays straightforwardly an example of UAM, so RM is not necessary to explain a conviction in such 
circumstances. 
12 J. Herring, Criminal Law, 10th edn. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2017), p.160. 
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There are two main arguments in favour of RM’s existence. First, there is the argument that 
there are levels of risk-taking with life and serious injury that have been “vacated”13 from 
murder, and – the argument claims – must now be the basis for involuntary manslaughter 
convictions.14 RM is, on this view, a “near neighbour” of murder,15 for those defendants at the 
“top end”16 of involuntary manslaughter “who currently fall just short of … murder”.17  
The second argument for the existence of RM focuses on whether the cases of advertent 
risk-taking causing death that were formerly murder could be accommodated under UAM and 
GNM. The aim is to show that a separate head of RM is necessary to explain criminal liability 
for manslaughter in at least some cases of advertent risk-taking with life or serious injury that 
are nowadays beyond the scope of murder. To succeed, the argument needs to demonstrate that 
there is necessary space for RM without overlap with UAM and GNM, and that convictions for 
manslaughter are properly returnable in such situations. 
Any argument that does not approach RM from the manslaughter end is deficient. 
Compare, for instance, the offence of rape: the fault element is that the defendant lacks a 
reasonable belief in consent.18 That captures a range of mental states, but nobody argues that 
those are independent heads of rape, from culpable inadvertence to the risk of non-consent to 
full knowledge of non-consent. 19  There is simply one fault element – the absence of a 
reasonable belief in consent – even if this can be satisfied by proof of “higher” mental states 
such as intention or recklessness with regard to the absence of consent. Accordingly, if there is 
no space for RM alone to explain liability for decided cases of manslaughter, there is no reason 
to accept the argument that RM must exist independently of UAM and GNM. 
The next sections contend that these arguments for RM’s existence are unconvincing. 
 
The Remainder of Murder 
                                                
13 See Smith “Adomako” [1994] Crim. L.R. 758, 759. 
14 D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Text, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, 12th edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.244. 
15 C.M.V. Clarkson, “Context and culpability in involuntary manslaughter: principle or instinct?” in A. Ashworth 
and B. Mitchell (eds.), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.148. 
16 V. Tadros, “The limits of manslaughter” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal Liability for Non-
aggressive Death (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.50. 
17 B. Mitchell and R.D. Mackay, “Investigating involuntary manslaughter: an empirical study of 127 cases” (2011) 
31 O.J.L.S. 165, 166. See, similarly, H. Keating, ‘The Law Commission report on involuntary manslaughter: the 
restoration of a serious crime” [1996] Crim. L.R. 535, 538. 
18 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(1)(c). 
19 Historically, the Court of Appeal has approved of the practice of having separate counts on an indictment 
alleging intentional and reckless commission of an offence (to assist with sentencing) – e.g. Hoof (1980) 72 Cr. 
App. R. 126). This practice does not detract from the point about the modern offence of rape. 
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Following the passing of section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967,20 attention turned properly 
to the states of awareness of risk that would satisfy the mens rea of murder. Hyam v. DPP21 
focussed on intentionally exposed “serious” risks of death or serious bodily injury, 22  or 
intentional risk-taking that rendered death or serious injury “highly probable”23 (or perhaps just 
“probable”).24 It was assumed that, if Hyam were not guilty of murder, she would be guilty of 
manslaughter.25 The Lords did not explain why, but UAM would be straightforward: Hyam’s 
act of arson was dangerous (i.e. the sober and reasonable person would have recognised the risk 
of some injury),26 and caused the victims’ deaths. Even if the majority had concluded that Hyam 
was not a murderer, they would not have needed RM to convict her of manslaughter. 
 As is well known, later cases added more clarity about the level of foresight sufficient 
to lead to an inference or finding of an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm in murder. 
In Moloney,27 the focus was on “natural” consequences, such that in the “ordinary course of 
events” death or serious bodily harm would follow.28 Moloney raised the bar of risk-taking 
required for murder (opaquely), potentially creating room for RM, whilst rendering 
superfluous29 the requirement that the risk be one that is intentionally imposed on others. The 
quest for further clarity30 led to the conclusion in Nedrick31 that the intention to kill or cause 
serious harm required for murder may be present only where the defendant acknowledged the 
virtual certainty that death or serious bodily harm would in fact follow from his act or 
omission.32 By that stage, the levels of foreseen risk of death or serious harm that had previously 
been relevant to murder and were thus now apparently relevant to manslaughter stretched from 
“serious” risks or “probable”/“highly probable” likelihoods of death or serious injury (no longer 
murder, but assumed by some writers to be RM) to those that are “virtually certain” to occur 
(potentially still murder). 
To further complicate matters, the permissive nature of Nedrick and Woollin (the jury 
may find intention…),33 makes it possible that foresight of a virtual certainty will not lead to a 
                                                
20 In response to DPP v Smith [1961] A.C. 290. 
21 [1975] A.C. 55. 
22 At 65, 75, 77, 79. 
23 At 82, 85. 
24 At 97. 
25 At 98. 
26 Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59; DPP v Newbury [1977] A.C. 500. 
27 [1985] A.C. 905. 
28 At 929. 
29 cf. A. Pedain, “Intention and the terrorist example” [2003] Crim. L.R. 579. 
30 Urged on by Hancock and Shankland [1986] A.C. 455. 
31 [1986] 1 W.L.R. 1025. 
32 Approved in Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82. 
33 Emphasised in Matthews and Alleyn [2003] EWCA Crim 192, [2003] 2 Cr. App. R. 30 at [43]. 
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finding of an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm in murder cases. Some difficult 
cases, such as the famous (and sadly now readily imaginable) example of a mother throwing 
her baby out of a high floor in a burning building, being virtually certain that this will kill or 
seriously harm the baby (but seeing no other way of potentially saving him) might not contain 
the fault element of murder on the basis that an intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm 
might not be “found” by the jury.34 Such cases would, assuming that the mother would also be 
found (if intention was not “found”) to be justified in having taken the risk of killing or seriously 
harming the baby, not be putative examples of RM either. 
Following the narrowing of the scope for findings of intention in murder cases, there is 
thus (quite a bit of) possible space for some defendants who were reckless as to a risk of causing 
death or serious injury, and would previously have been murderers, to be convicted instead of 
involuntary manslaughter. It is worth noting, for completeness, that nothing in theory prevents 
lower levels of foresight of the risk of death (or serious bodily harm, if it is sufficient) from 
securing a conviction for RM, 35  insofar as the taking of such risks might be adjudged 
unjustifiable. The point has simply never arisen for decision, and will not until greater clarity 
exists over the existence and place of RM, and thus the appropriateness of any directions given 
by the trial judge regarding it. 
The argument for the existence of RM that flows from the gradual narrowing of the 
mens rea of murder will succeed in being convincing only if the levels of risk-taking with life 
and serious injury mentioned above are not accommodated by the offences of UAM and GNM 
in cases where convictions have been returned properly. If they are, there is no need to recognise 
the existence of a separate offence of RM to explain convictions. The next sections contend that 
UAM and GNM leave very little room behind for RM, and that in that room it is uncertain that 
manslaughter is an available verdict. 
 
The Reach of Unlawful Act Manslaughter 
The cases on involuntary manslaughter decided during the period covered by the previous 
section (roughly, the 1960s-1990s) are difficult to interpret, largely because of looseness in the 
understanding of the word “reckless” during that period.36 As is well known, recklessness can 
                                                
34  For discussion, see A.W. Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp.70-71. 
35 For discussion, see D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Text, Cases and Materials on 
Criminal Law, 12th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.244. 
36 For a detailed survey, see A. Halpin, Definition in the Criminal Law (Oxford: Hart, 2004), ch. 3; See, also, F. 
Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in Scots and English Criminal Law (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011), ch. 3, available at https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/9797. 
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be (and during this time period was, in English law) defined in terms of the defendant’s 
awareness of the relevant risk (“subjective”, Cunningham37 recklessness), or in terms of the 
foreseeability to the reasonable person of the relevant risk (“objective”, Caldwell 38 
recklessness). The word reckless was also used, at times, to describe behaviour. For instance, 
in Wesson,39 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter on the basis that he had handled a 
firearm recklessly and had discharged it unintentionally, killing his wife. The word “reckless” 
appears to refer to the simple carelessness of the actions performed by the defendant, rather 
than making claims about his state of awareness of or indeed the foreseeability of the risk of 
his wife’s death.40 Cunningham has argued convincingly that such uses of recklessness should 
be accommodated under the banner of negligence,41 but (as she acknowledges) this is not 
historically what has happened in English law. Mindful of this difficulty over establishing the 
meaning of recklessness in the context of involuntary manslaughter, cautious progress can be 
made.  
Starting with UAM, in many circumstances where the defendant does foresee a risk of 
death or serious harm attendant upon his criminal act, this will be swallowed up by the base 
offence from which manslaughter is constructed.42 For instance, if the defendant foresees the 
risk of inflicting grievous bodily harm, and grievous bodily harm is inflicted as a result of her 
act,43 the defendant commits an offence under section 20 of the Offences against the Person 
Act 1861. Assuming the defendant’s act was dangerous (in the sense described below), if the 
harmed person subsequently dies as a result of that unlawful and dangerous act, then the 
defendant will be convicted of UAM. 
Of course, the section 20 offence can be committed where the defendant foresees the 
risk of some harm,44 so there is in fact no need for foresight of even grievous bodily harm to 
found liability for UAM. The difficulty is thinking up an example of so-called RM, then, that 
would not creep into the territory occupied by section 20. The more detailed examples that are 
                                                
37 [1957] 2 Q.B. 396. 
38 [1982] A.C. 341. 
39 (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 161. 
40 See, too, Lowe [1973] Q.B. 702. 
41 S. Cunningham, “Recklessness: being reckless and acting recklessly” (2010) 21 King’s College L.J. 445. This 
underplays the fact that negligence can also be about the defendant’s failure to have certain beliefs. See F. Stark, 
Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016), ch. 8. 
42 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: 
Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), pp.422-423. There is the odd suggestion by counsel for the 
defence in Anderton (1994) 15 Cr. App. R. (S.) 532 that the case was “reckless manslaughter” on the basis that the 
defendant’s action was not deliberate, but this is – it is submitted – not important to the present discussion. 
43 UAM cannot be committed by omission: Lowe [1973] Q.B. 702. 
44 Mowatt [1968] 1 Q.B. 421. 
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sometimes given are unconvincing. Consider the tentative example from Simester and Sullivan: 
“D, an archer, might continue with his target practice even though V is present within the 
vicinity. When aiming at the target, D would not necessarily commit any offence against V. 
Accordingly, if V were killed by D’s overshooting arrow, it might not be a case of constructive 
manslaughter but it would be reckless manslaughter if D foresaw a risk of causing death or 
serious harm.”45 Why, it might be asked, focus on when D aims the arrow? Is firing an arrow 
in such circumstances not going to result in a section 20 offence being committed if contact is 
made and serious injury results? The defendant is aware of the risk of some harm and the social 
worth of practising arrow shooting hardly justifies the defendant’s action. The action is 
dangerous and causes death.46 The same problem arises with Tadros’s example of a driver’s 
evading the police47 (assuming the driver foresaw the risk of some harm) and Wilson’s person 
who, for a joke, removes a ladder, trapping a window cleaner on a balcony, aware of the risk 
that he might break his leg trying to jump down.48 UAM is readily made out in these examples. 
More difficult are cases of omission, but these will be returned to below. 
Moving beyond the base crime in UAM, the question of dangerousness has focussed, at 
least since Church,49 on whether some bodily harm was a foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant’s criminal action.50 This test would thus incorporate the levels of advertent risk-
taking that used to satisfy the fault element of murder, and go further: only some bodily harm 
must be foreseeable. The reach of UAM is, as has been recognised countless times, incredibly 
broad, leaving very little necessary space for a separate head of RM to explain a defendant’s 
conviction for manslaughter. 
Some potential space for RM is, of course, created by the limits of UAM. First, there 
are cases where the defendant’s conduct is not criminal, or not criminal per se (e.g. criminalised 
simply in virtue of its careless performance).51 Consider the electrician in Holloway (a case 
heard with Adomako in the Court of Appeal),52 whose improper wiring of a central-heating 
                                                
45 A.P. Simester, J.R. Spencer, F. Stark, G.R. Sullivan and G.J. Virgo, Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: 
Theory and Doctrine, 6th edn. (Oxford: Hart, 2016), p.423. A footnote points out that assault might be committed 
whilst aiming, which ignores the fact that the relevant act is surely D’s firing the arrow and hitting V. 
46 Alternatively, assuming a risk of death is obvious in such situations, it could be said that, taking D’s foresight 
of risk into account, his actions were “reckless” to the extent that they satisfy the high standard of gross negligence 
(see the discussion of this point below). 
47 V. Tadros, “The limits of manslaughter” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal Liability for Non-
aggressive Death (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp.40-41. 
48 W. Wilson, “The structure of criminal homicide” [2006] Crim. L.R. 471, 484. 
49 [1966] 1 Q.B. 59. See, too, DPP v Newbury [1977] A.C. 500. 
50 See, recently, F(J) and E(N) [2015] EWCA Crim 351, [2015] 2 Cr. App. R. 5. 
51 Andrews v DPP [1937] A.C. 576 at 585. 
52 Reported with Prentice [1994] Q.B. 302. 
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system, and failure to fix it over a period of four months, caused death. If the defendant was so 
incompetent as to not be aware of the risk of even some harm resulting from his actions, he was 
not on his way to committing a section 20 offence in leaving the wiring in its unsafe state. Other 
imaginable offences concerning wiring will no doubt raise the thorny question of whether an 
offence of strict liability can ever be the base crime in UAM.53 Even if it is correct that UAM 
is unavailable in relation to such offences, this example will, however, be of little help to the 
defender of the view that a distinct offence of RM exists in contemporary English criminal law. 
Assuming the recklessness involved in RM is “subjective”, then RM could not (if it exists) lead 
to the electrician’s conviction of manslaughter. 
GNM could, however, come to the rescue. Indeed, the trial judge in Holloway attempted 
to leave GNM to the jury but misdirected them through reliance on Lawrence.54 Had the trial 
judge told the jury that the defendant’s carelessness, taking into account his explanations for 
why he did not foresee a risk of death or serious injury, had to be “reckless” (in an “ordinary” 
sense of the word, which will be seen below to incorporate at least some cases of inadvertent 
risk-taking), then his conviction might not have been interfered with. It is possible, so long as 
a serious and obvious risk of death is foreseeable (even if not foreseen by the individual 
defendant), that other non-criminal yet dangerous acts could be caught by GNM. A separate 
head of RM is not needed to fill this gap in UAM. 
Secondly, there are cases where the base crime is an omission and cannot be the basis 
for UAM.55 It is not difficult to imagine situations where the defendant realises that, if he fails 
to do a certain act, somebody may realistically die or be caused serious injury, and failing to 
act constitutes unjustified risk-taking. Again, many such situations will readily be captured by 
GNM. GNM is particularly well suited for cases where the defendant was under a duty to act 
and failed to do so, where death was a readily foreseeable (even if unforeseen) potential 
consequence. That was exactly the kind of fact situation raised by Adomako’s failure to notice 
the problem with his patient’s breathing.56 (Where an obvious and serious risk of death is not 
present in relation to the defendant’s omission, this raises additional difficulties, returned to 
below.) 
                                                
53 See: D. Ormerod, “Andrews” [2003] Crim. L.R. 477; D. Ormerod and D Perry (eds.), Blackstone’s Criminal 
Practice 2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), paras.B1.53-B1.54;, 479; M. Dyson, “The smallest fault 
in manslaughter” [2017] 6 Archbold Review 4. 
54 Prentice [1994] Q.B. 302 at 337-339. 
55 Lowe [1973] Q.B. 702 at 709. 
56 Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171. 
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The reach of UAM (especially when premised on the section 20 offence) is thus wide, 
and GNM covers a wealth of cases where UAM is unavailable (subject to the comments below 
about the limits of GNM).  
One recent possible exception to this concerns cases where the defendant is alleged to 
have been an accessory to an offence of violence less serious than the intentional infliction of 
GBH, and the principal has committed murder. The judgment in Jogee and Ruddock57 is clear 
that this could be a case of secondary liability for manslaughter, but it is unclear exactly how. 
One explanation presented in Jogee and Ruddock is UAM.58 It is difficult to see how, however, 
liability for UAM follows if the unlawful act (something below GBH with intent) that the 
defendant intentionally encouraged or assisted did not itself cause death.59 
Could RM explain the apparently straightforward manslaughter conviction in such cases 
where UAM seems problematic and GNM would be inappropriate to charge?60 There is the 
suggestion in Jogee and Ruddock that “If a person is a party to a violent attack on another, 
without an intent to assist in the causing of death or really serious harm, but the violence 
escalates and results in death, he will not be guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter.”61 
This route to liability was (it appears) juxtaposed with UAM, but is surely expressed far too 
broadly, even if RM exists. Following Jogee and Ruddock, the defendant would need to intend 
to assist or encourage the principal to act with such foresight of risk before he could be liable 
as an accessory for RM.62 
Even if this RM route is what was being described (opaquely) in the relevant part of 
Jogee and Ruddock, the Court’s comments are too vague to be a firm doctrinal basis for 
concluding that RM is necessary as an explanation of an appropriately returnable manslaughter 
conviction. The sounder conclusion is that there is a serious question, which the Court of Appeal 
will have to face in due course, over whether manslaughter convictions are indeed as easy to 
make out as the decision in Jogee and Ruddock suggested. 
The next section considers whether there will be cases where GNM cannot 
accommodate alleged RM cases that fall into the space left by UAM, thus necessitating a 
separate head of involuntary manslaughter. 
 
                                                
57 [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7, [2017] A.C. 387.  
58 At [96]. 
59 A.P. Simester, “Accessory liability and common unlawful purpose” (2017) 133 L.Q.R. 73, 86-87. 
60 cf. D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Text, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, 12th 
edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.246. 
61 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7, [2017] A.C. 387 at [96]. 
62 Jogee and Ruddock [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7, [2017] A.C. 387 at [10], [90]. 
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Gross Negligence Manslaughter: Before Lidar 
The relationship between recklessness and gross negligence has always been unclear. Some 
older manslaughter cases make clear that recklessness was simply a way of explaining the high 
level of carelessness involved in the defendant’s act or omission, and distinguishing 
manslaughter from cases of simple (blameless) inadvertence (“ordinary” negligence, if you 
will).63 In Andrews v DPP,64 Lord Hewart CJ said famously that “Probably of all the epithets 
that can be applied [to the high degree of carelessness] ‘reckless’ most nearly covers the case… 
recklessness suggests an indifference to risk whereas the accused may have appreciated the risk 
and intended to avoid it and yet have shown such a high degree of negligence in the means 
adopted to avoid the risk as would justify a conviction” [emphasis added].65 Thus, recklessness 
was originally a synonym of gross negligence (regarding the “life and safety of others” in 
Andrews),66 and not necessarily an advertent mental state. It was not, at that time, a distinct 
fault element for involuntary manslaughter. Although the defendant’s awareness of risk was 
certainly a factor in determining whether the defendant had been grossly negligent,67 it was not 
a necessary ingredient of liability. 
This trend towards equating gross negligence with recklessness (and not defining 
recklessness “subjectively”) continued through the 1970s when the mens rea of murder began 
to narrow.68 In Stone and Dobinson,69 a requirement of “subjective” awareness of a risk of death 
or serious bodily harm in GNM cases was rejected. It was held that “indifference to an obvious 
risk and appreciation of such risk [of death or “injury to health”], coupled with a determination 
to nevertheless run it, [were] both examples of recklessness”,70 and recklessness was still 
simply a way of explaining to the jury the high degree of negligence required. It will be noted 
that indifference was juxtaposed with “appreciation” of the relevant risk of death or “injury to 
health”,71 suggesting that indifference could exist independently of awareness of those risks. 
This point will be returned to later in the discussion of Lidar. 
In the 1980s, the cases where the Caldwell/Lawrence sense of recklessness (which 
included “obvious” unjustified risks that the defendant might have missed) was applied in 
                                                
63 E.g. Finney (1874) 12 Cox C.C. 625 at 626. See, further, K.JM. Smith, Lawyers, Legislators and Theorists 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.192-195. 
64 [1937] A.C. 576. 
65 At 583 (emphasis added). 
66 Apparently synonymous with serious injury: Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 21 at [49]. 
67 See, also, Lamb [1967] 2 Q.B. 981 at 990. 
68 E.g. Cato [1976] 1 W.L.R. 110 at 114, 117, 119. 
69 [1977] Q.B. 354. 
70 At 363. 
71 See, too, R v West London Coroner (ex p. Gray and Others) [1988] Q.B. 467 at 477. 
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manslaughter cases provide further support for the view that recklessness was not understood 
as requiring foresight of death, or indeed serious bodily harm. For example, in Seymour,72 the 
House of Lords held that foresight of such risks was not an ingredient of manslaughter, even if 
“recklessness” was the appropriate way to explain the fault in involuntary manslaughter to the 
jury.73 In the 1983 edition of his Textbook on Criminal Law, Williams thus referred to “reckless 
manslaughter” as involving “what is called recklessness (in a special sense)”, referring to 
Bateman.74 Around the same time, Smith and Hogan reported that “It was not clear whether 
[recklessness and gross negligence] were merely two ways of describing the same thing, or 
whether they represented two distinct conditions of fault.”75 It is submitted that it was tolerably 
clear that the courts were using the words to describe the same, difficult to define, thing: the 
level of carelessness required for a conviction for involuntary manslaughter. 
The synonymy of recklessness and gross negligence in involuntary manslaughter was 
re-emphasised in the 1990s in Adomako, where – despite discouraging use of the 
Caldwell/Lawrence direction on recklessness – Lord Mackay (with whom the other Lords 
agreed) opined that “it [is] perfectly appropriate that the word ‘reckless’ should be used in cases 
of involuntary manslaughter, but as Lord Atkin put it [in Andrews] 76  ‘in the ordinary 
connotation of that word’”. 77  Recklessness was still not being given the “subjective”, 
awareness-based meaning in relation to GNM, even by the mid 1990s. Once again, foresight of 
the risk of death (or perhaps serious injury, if the older cases were right) would simply be a 
factor to take into account when considering whether the defendant was, overall, grossly 
negligent in relation to the killing.78 There was thus no third category of (“subjective”) RM 
recognised in judicial overviews of the law at around the same time.79 
It is worth noting at this point that the courts have never engaged in the following a 
fortiori argument: “subjective” recklessness regarding the risk of death (or, more 
controversially, GBH), being a “higher” form of mens rea than “gross negligence” with regard 
to a serious and obvious risk of death, automatically satisfies the mens rea requirements of 
GNM. (Just as intending that the complainant was not consenting will satisfy the relevant mens 
                                                
72 [1983] 2 A.C. 493. 
73 See, too: Kong Cheuk Kwan v The Queen (1986) 82 Cr. App. R. 18; Goodfellow (1986) 83 Cr. App. R. 23 at 28. 
74 G. Williams, Textbook on Criminal Law, 2nd edn. (London: Stephens, 1983), p.259 (emphasis supressed). 
75 J.C. Smith and B. Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th edn. (London: Butterworths, 1988), p.352. Similar statements 
appear in the 7th (p.372), 8th (p.384), 9th (p.375) and 10th (p.385) editions. 
76 [1937] A.C. 576 at 583. 
77 [1995] 1 A.C. 171 at 187. 
78 This is consistent with reading Adomako to require a risk of death to which the defendant was (“objectively”) 
grossly negligent. 
79 E.g. Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) [1998] A.C. 245 at 269. 
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rea requirement of rape.) Instead, foresight of a risk of death or serious bodily harm has 
consistently been considered a factor in assessing whether there was gross negligence. 
By the close of the 1990s, then, the situation was that significant levels of foresight of 
a risk of death or serious injury (together with certain foreseeable risks of injury) could be 
accommodated by UAM and GNM. This explains why contemporary explanations of the 
argument that RM necessarily existed were usually80 coy. Consider the Law Commission’s 
1996 view that, post-Moloney, cases involving foresight of death or serious injury “must have 
fallen, by default, into the scope of the offence of manslaughter. There is little or no separate 
authority, however, about this type of manslaughter, since such cases are dealt with in practice 
as cases of unlawful act manslaughter, and the accused’s awareness of the risk is taken into 
account only as an aggravating factor when it comes to sentencing.”81 In fact, there was simply 
no authority, by 1996, grounding a separate head of RM.82 The Commission was simply unable 
to prove the relevant negative. 
Supporters of the argument for RM’s modern existence will point nowadays to positive 
evidence of RM in the “leading”83 authority of Lidar,84 decided in 1999. It is worth analysing 
Lidar in some depth, before consideration turns to the boundary of GNM and any space it may 
leave behind for RM. 
 
Re-assessing Lidar 
Lidar drove his Range Rover at speed, whilst another person (X) hung half in, and half out, of 
it. Eventually, X’s foot was caught in a wheel, and he was dragged fully out of the vehicle and 
run over by it. He died of his injuries. The trial judge directed the jury on manslaughter 
explicitly in terms of recklessness as to the risk of death or (a vague degree) of injury, not gross 
negligence, and the Court of Appeal had to decide whether this was a misdirection, given the 
re-assertion of gross negligence in manslaughter five years earlier in Adomako. As noted above, 
Lord Mackay had permitted in Adomako the continuation of explanations of that level of fault 
in terms of “ordinary” recklessness with regard to the risk of causing death, with awareness of 
the risk of death or (if the older authorities remained sound) serious injury being a factor to 
                                                
80 cf. J.C. Smith, Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law, 9th edn. (London: Butterworths, 1999), p.645. 
81 Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com. No.237, 1996), para.2.27 (emphasis added). 
82  cf. J.C. Smith “Khan and Khan” [1998] Crim. L.R. 830, 831 (“There are two categories of involuntary 
manslaughter: (i) manslaughter by an unlawful and dangerous act... and (ii) manslaughter by gross negligence or 
recklessness”). 
83 D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
p.645. 
84 [2000] Archbold News 3. 
  13 
consider, rather than determinative. Although the trial judge was open to criticism for not 
indicating the importance of awareness of a risk of serious harm, as opposed to lower levels of 
harm, the conviction was adjudged safe in the circumstances. 
Is Lidar, then, a case of GNM, but using Lord Mackay’s “ordinary” sense of 
recklessness? It is impossible to be absolutely certain, because what is available of the judgment 
is unclear. The Court of Appeal in Lidar explained the relevant understanding of recklessness 
in the following terms:85  
 
We find it difficult to understand how the point of criminal liability can be reached, where gross 
negligence is alleged, without identifying the point by reference to the concept of recklessness 
as it is commonly understood: that is to say, whether the driver of the motor vehicle was aware 
of the necessary degree of risk of serious injury to the victim and nevertheless chose to disregard 
it, or was indifferent to it. 
 
The opening words of this sentence suggest that the Court was attempting to explain an example 
of GNM, not set out a distinct form of manslaughter. Despite this, and mindful of the dangers 
of reading reports of judgments as though they are statutes, it must be noted that the latter part 
of the Court’s statement is ambiguous regarding the relevance of awareness of risk. By contrast 
to Stone and Dobinson, indifference is not juxtaposed clearly with such awareness: awareness 
of risk is mentioned before the distinction between choice and indifference, which might 
suggest that awareness of a risk of death or serious bodily injury is core to both conceptions of 
recklessness. 
The statement in Lidar about recklessness admits, unhelpfully, of two interpretations. 
The first is that the defendant had to: (1) be aware of the risk of at least serious harm; and then 
(2a) choose to take it, or (2b) be indifferent as to it.86 The difficulty is making sense of the 
distinction between these concepts: the defendant’s indifference towards the relevant risk(s) is 
presumably demonstrated in his failure to be moved appropriately by his awareness of the 
risk(s), i.e. his choice to take the risk(s).87 Perhaps the court meant indifference to speak to an 
additional attitude towards the foreseen risk(s), but this is an unusual conception of recklessness 
in English criminal law, and is an unconvincing reading of Lidar. 
                                                
85 At 4. 
86 There is a wealth of discussion on the point of whether a person can be indifferent to that which she has not 
foreseen. See, e.g., A.R. White, Misleading Cases (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), p.38; R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency 
and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), ch.7. See, further, 
Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com. No.304, 2006), para.2.99. 
87 See, similarly, J. Burchell, Principles of Criminal Law, 4th edn. (Claremont: Juta, 2013), pp.365-370. 
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The alternative, if less literal, way to read the comments in Lidar is that they appear to 
endorse alternative, rather than cumulative criteria: not only awareness-based recklessness as 
to the risk of death or serious bodily harm form part of the fault element of involuntary 
manslaughter (GNM, to be precise), but also indifference to (i.e. a culpable failure to notice) 
those same risks. As Elliott noted soon afterwards, this makes Lidar look similar to the 
Lawrence-recklessness conception of involuntary manslaughter that was downplayed in 
Adomako in favour of gross negligence.88 The understanding of recklessness in Lidar is also 
similar to the pre-Lawrence understanding of manslaughter present in Stone and Dobinson, 
where a non-awareness-based conception of “indifference” was used as a marker of gross 
negligence. On one view, then, Lidar is simply a(nother) case where recklessness qua (at least 
sometimes inadvertent) indifference to the risks of death or serious injury was used to explain 
the high level of carelessness required for a conviction of GNM, rather than a decision 
recognising the necessary existence of a third category of involuntary manslaughter premised 
on awareness of the relevant risk(s). 
 This alternative way of understanding the brief discussion of recklessness in Lidar 
conceives of indifference to risk as a distinct, not (always) awareness-based form of culpability. 
This reading suggests that the defendant did not need to be aware of the risk of death or serious 
harm (in the sense of having a belief that it existed at the relevant time), 89  but instead 
demonstrated through his failure to notice that risk that he was insufficiently motivated by the 
interests threatened.90  This form of understanding of indifference avoids tautology and is 
consistent with earlier decisions on GNM such as Andrews and Stone and Dobinson, which 
viewed indifference to the risk of death or serious injury as one mark of gross negligence. Such 
an inadvertent conception of indifference towards risk is also, although the law was far from 
clear, present in at least some rape cases from the 1980s and 1990s.91 Indifference towards the 
risks of death or serious injury is, then, of vital importance to understanding Lidar, yet at least 
two leading textbooks fail to even mention it when discussing RM.92 This gives the misleading 
impression that Lidar recognised only an awareness-based conception of RM. 
                                                
88 C. Elliott, “What direction for gross negligence manslaughter?: R v. Lidar and Attorney-General’s Reference 
(No. 2 of 1999)” (2001) 65 J. Crim. L. 145, 145-147. 
89 See F. Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016), ch.4. 
90 cf. R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1990), ch.7. 
91 See J. Temkin, “The limits of reckless rape” [1983] Crim. L.R. 5; S. Gardner, “Reckless and inconsiderate rape” 
[1991] Crim. L.R. 172, 172-175. 
92 D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
p.645; J. Horder, Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal Law, 8th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.302. 
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It is noteworthy, however, that in Adomako, the focus had begun to turn to gross 
negligence regarding a serious and obvious risk of death,93 and thus Lidar is problematic in 
suggesting that inadvertent indifference to a risk of serious injury could ever be enough for 
GNM.94 It is nevertheless easier to conceive of this anomaly as an example of the Court of 
Appeal mis-speaking (or at least being misreported), rather than as a sound basis for concluding 
that in reality they were identifying RM as independent of GNM. 
 Lidar is, then, a simple case of GNM, where awareness of the risk of death or serious 
injury was recognised simply a factor to consider in relation to the final question of whether 
the defendant was grossly negligent. Accepting this point is not problematic in explaining the 
court’s decision to uphold the defendant’s conviction. The defendant’s action showed a very 
clear disregard for the life of his “passenger” (to whom he presumably owed a duty), and his 
awareness of the risk of serious injury (if not death!) corroborates his high degree of culpability 
in relation to the death.95Additionally, even if these points about GNM were debated, Lidar was 
inevitably committing a section 20 offence, given his awareness of X’s being at risk of at least 
some harm by Lidar’s actions, so UAM could also have been made out. In short, Lidar does 
not indicate the necessity of RM to explain why the defendant was liable for manslaughter.  
 
After Lidar 
Months after Lidar, it was confirmed in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999)96 that the 
gross negligence test in Adomako was “objective” and that a conviction for manslaughter could 
be returned in cases of inadvertent risk-taking.97 Indeed, the Court endorsed the view in Stone 
and Dobinson that indifference to a risk of “injury to health” could be sufficient for gross 
negligence.98 The Court of Appeal nevertheless went on to say that, in certain circumstances, 
proof of advertent recklessness as to levels of injury, or death, would be crucial to a finding of 
gross negligence.99 Again, an a fortiori argument based on recklessness being a “higher” mens 
rea state than gross negligence, and thus could stand in its stead, was not adopted. 
                                                
cf. D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith, Hogan and Ormerod’s Text, Cases and Materials on Criminal Law, 12th edn. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p.246. 
93 [1995] 1 A.C. 171 at 187. 
94 See, too, Mirsa [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 21. 
95 Furthermore, in a case of such clear culpability, presumably the court was anxious to avoid quashing a conviction 
on the basis of the exact language used by the trial judge: J. Rogers, “The Law Commission’s proposed restructure 
of homicide” (2006) 70 J. Crim. L. 223, 227 (fn. 16). 
96 [2000] Q.B. 796. 
97 [2000] Q.B. 796 at 809. See, further: R v. DPP, ex p Jones [2000] I.R.L.R. 373; R v. DPP [2003] EWHC 693 
(Admin) at [29]. 
98 At 809.  
99 At 809. 
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As Smith explained in his commentary to R v DPP, ex p Jones,100 the best that could be 
made of the law was that proof of “subjective” recklessness (it is unclear from the case and 
commentary whether only relating to the risk of death, or including risks of serious injury) 
might convince the jury to convict in cases where it is not entirely clear that, “objectively”, the 
defendant’s conduct was grossly negligent.101  This might be taken to mean that proof of 
advertent recklessness with regard to the risk of death, or potentially serious injury, might be 
necessary in cases where “ordinary” recklessness (i.e. gross negligence) is not clear on the 
facts.102 In other words, a person’s conduct could, if inadvertent, look simply careless, and the 
death constitute a regrettable accident, but – in circumstances of advertence to the risk of death, 
or perhaps serious injury – the same conduct could look extremely callous and support a 
conviction for GNM.103 Such awareness of risk is not, however, a necessary condition of 
liability for GNM.104 Gross negligence is not “recklessness in disguise”,105 at least as a matter 
of law.  
As a matter of doctrine, accepting this point about recklessness in manslaughter is 
unproblematic, even following the departure from Caldwell in criminal damage cases in G and 
Another.106 It is important to remember, although this point is often forgotten,107 that it is 
conceptually possible for different understandings of recklessness to still exist in England and 
Wales. Lord Bingham was careful to limit his consideration of the definition of recklessness to 
the immediate context of criminal damage. 108  Lord Rodger saw the benefits of adopting 
different understandings of recklessness in different contexts.109 Despite statements from the 
Court of Appeal about G and Another’s “general principles”,110 it is thus still – as a matter of 
doctrine – possible for recklessness to be interpreted “objectively” in certain contexts. 
It is submitted that this is particularly true if recklessness was already used in an 
“objective” sense prior to G and Another, and not based on Caldwell. Recklessness was so 
                                                
100 [2000] Crim. L.R. 858, 860. 
101 Smith was, it should be noted, not convinced that this was correct in theory. 
102 cf. D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p.644. 
103 Note Quick’s finding that in cases of so-called medical manslaughter, the prosecution would often only proceed 
against medical professionals who were in fact aware of the risk of death: O. Quick, “Prosecuting (Gross) Medical 
Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and the Crown Prosecution Service” (2006) 33 Journal of Law and Society 
421, 444-445. 
104 R (Rowley) v DPP [2003] EWHC 693 (Admin) at [29]. 
105 O. Quick, “Medical killing: need for a specific offence?” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal 
Liability for Non-aggressive Death (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), p.163.  
106 [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 A.C. 1034. 
107 cf. Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 21 at [55]. 
108 At [28]. 
109 At [69]. 
110 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868, [2005] Q.B. 73 at [12]. 
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understood in involuntary manslaughter since at least the 1930s, and it was Lawrence (a 
decision that was not disavowed in G and Another)111  that influenced later manslaughter 
decisions such as Seymour.112 Furthermore, things had moved on beyond Lawrence/Seymour 
with the House of Lords’ decision in Adomako. Thus it is defensible (in the doctrinal sense) for 
the courts to view G and Another as having no bearing on the understanding of “recklessness” 
adopted in GNM.113 As a matter of theory, it would be preferable if mens rea words such as 
recklessness were used consistently in the criminal law (and the language of recklessness 
simply dropped in this context, in favour of gross negligence),114 but there is no doctrinal 
necessity for the courts to conclude that manslaughter must now require G and Another’s brand 
of recklessness. It would be better – if this approach is to be persisted in – to explain that the 
case for a finding of gross negligence is strengthened where the defendant was aware of the 
risk of death or (serious?) injury attaching to her conduct, and eschew talk of recklessness 
altogether. 
 Alas, the mixing and matching of gross negligence and recklessness has continued. For 
instance, in Mark and Nationwide Heating Services Ltd,115 the trial judge directed the jury on 
what “gross negligence” meant by making reference to recklessness: “where there is an obvious 
and serious risk of death, a defendant was either indifferent to that risk – i.e. he demonstrated 
he couldn’t care less about it – or, having recognised the risk, deliberately chose to run it”. The 
juxtaposition of foresight-based recklessness (notably towards the risk of death only) and 
indifference-based recklessness is here clearer than it was in Lidar. The Court of Appeal 
explained that there was some space between recklessness and gross negligence: “a defendant 
might appreciate risk and intend to avoid it but show such a high degree of negligence as to 
justify its categorisation as gross”.116 The gross negligence here is not created through the 
defendant’s decision to take the relevant risk (of death), but rather through the inept steps taken 
towards avoiding it. Such defendants are difficult to describe as “indifferent” to risk (they are 
trying, albeit ineptly, to avoid it), and it might be difficult to show that they have chosen to take 
a risk that they are trying very hard to avoid. 
                                                
111 G and Another [2003] UKHL 50, [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 at [28]. 
112 [1983] 2 A.C. 493. 
113 Mark and Nationwide Heating Services Ltd [2004] EWCA Crim 2490 at [33]. 
114 F. Stark, “‘It’s Only Words’: On Meaning and Mens Rea” (2013) 72 C.L.J. 155. 
115 [2004] EWCA Crim 2490 at [22]. 
116 This is not the only space between the concepts, insofar as it might be grossly negligent to conclude for 
insufficient reason that a foreseen risk of death (or perhaps serious injury) had been removed entirely. 
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In Winter and Winter,117 the defendants had been convicted on an indictment alleging 
GNM, and yet the trial judge made references to the defendant’s awareness of the particular 
risks involved in their conduct and the jury was told to convict only if the defendants had been 
“reckless” (regarding precisely which risks it is not entirely clear). 118  This definition of 
recklessness is not included in the appellate judgment, but the transcript shows that it was 
beyond dispute that the defendants were aware of the risk of killing or harming someone. Even 
if the trial judge had meant “subjective” recklessness as to the risk of death (or serious injury), 
that such a direction was given in a GNM case is not necessarily incoherent. The defendants’ 
carelessness might have been recognised by the trial judge as being careless, but not careless 
enough (without awareness of the risk of death, or perhaps of some level of injury) to be left to 
the jury. On appeal, it appears that recklessness was conceived of not as an ingredient of GNM 
per se, but as a “seriously aggravating factor” affecting sentencing.119 The use of recklessness 
to emphasise the particularly culpable quality of the defendant’s conduct is found in other 
sentencing decisions.120 
 Harder to explain is Hussain,121 which appears to give credence to the view that RM 
exists as a distinct head of involuntary manslaughter, specifically premised on advertence to 
the risk of death or serious bodily harm.122 The defendant’s car had collided (faultlessly) with 
a two-year-old child. Hussain panicked, and drove on, with the child under the car. The child 
was killed as a result of Hussain’s decision to drive on after the initial accident. It was explained 
on appeal that the Crown’s case had been “put on the basis, not of unlawful act manslaughter 
or gross negligence, but on the basis of reckless manslaughter … that [the defendant] foresaw 
the risk of serious injury or death … and yet chose to take that risk and death resulted”.123  
The doctrinal claim that the Crown was really charging a separate head of manslaughter, 
rather than just a particularly egregious example of UAM or GNM, is weak. First, the existence 
of RM as a separate category of involuntary manslaughter is suspect, as has been demonstrated 
at length. Secondly, if the jury had been asked whether driving, aware that a two-year-old child 
was under the car, was carelessness sufficient to meet the standard of gross negligence, it is 
                                                
117 [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 78. 
118 At [43]. 
119 At [46]. 
120 E.g. Brown [2010] EWCA Crim 2832, [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 11 at [1] (“This is said to be a case of 
manslaughter by gross negligence, but manslaughter by prolonged recklessness is perhaps closer to the mark.”); S 
[2015] EWCA Crim 558, [2015] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 29 at [26]. 
121 [2012] EWCA Crim 188, [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 75. 
122 See D. Ormerod and K. Laird, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, 14th edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p.644. 
123 Hussain [2012] EWCA Crim 188, [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 75 at [25]. 
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unlikely that they would have had reasonable doubt. Once again, there is no need for RM to be 
wheeled out to explain the defendant’s conviction (although it may of course be desirable for 
the prosecution to emphasise the defendant’s awareness of the risks involved in driving on in 
terms of sentencing). The fact that GNM requires an obvious risk of death (see below) is no 
barrier to conviction here. The defendant’s actions carried with them a clear risk not simply of 
serious injury (although that might have been all the defendant himself, who had a low IQ, 
foresaw); they were also actions that clearly gave rise to a risk of death.124 Once again, UAM 
would alternatively have been made out: presumably it is at least a section 20 offence to drive 
a car, aware of the risk that a person is underneath and will suffer some harm, and the 
defendant’s offence was both dangerous and caused death. If either GNM or UAM had been 
used, the defendant’s awareness of the risk of death or serious injury could, as will be discussed 
later, in theory have aggravated the sentence he received. 
 
The Reach of Gross Negligence Manslaughter 
Even with the decisions in Lidar and Hussain explained, there might still be alleged to be space 
for RM cases where manslaughter is a potential verdict, but that cannot fall under GNM. The 
significant limit on GNM is that there must nowadays be a serious and obvious risk of death,125 
i.e. a serious risk of death that would be obvious to the reasonable person in the defendant’s 
situation. 126  (The extent to which the defendant’s characteristics and knowledge will be 
considered is notoriously difficult.) A case where the defendant is aware of a risk of death (that 
it would be unjustified to take) arising from an omission, where a serious and obvious risk of 
death is “objectively” unforeseeable, is unlikely to arise in practice. Far more likely to arise is 
a case where the defendant foresees a risk of serious harm arising from an omission (that in the 
circumstances it is unjustified to take), and an obvious and serious risk of death is “objectively” 
unforeseeable. Consider the following example:127 
 
                                                
124 D. Ormerod (ed.), Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2017 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), para.B1.36. 
125 Misra [2005] EWCA Crim 2375, [2005] 1 Cr. App. R. 21; Rudling [2016] EWCA Crim 741. 
126 Singh [1999] Crim. L.R. 582. 
127 An alternative example is as follows: 
 
Dirty Restaurant: D omits to carry out basic food safety checks in her restaurant. D foresees the risk that this could 
result in serious harm to a diner. V dines in the restaurant. A vulnerability of V’s means that he dies after 
contracting a bug from eating the food. Assume, again, that the risk of death was not “objectively” obvious and 
serious. 
 
Again, intuitions are going to differ over whether this should be manslaughter (as opposed to some other offence) 
and the point remains that it is unclear whether it can be, at least on the existing authorities.  
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School Dinner: D, who is responsible for preparing the meals at a school, sees V, a 
pupil, pick up a sandwich that contains pesto. D is aware of V’s allergy to pine nuts. V 
is unaware that pesto contains pine nuts. D, who dislikes V, omits to warn V about the 
sandwich, foreseeing the risk that V may be seriously injured as a result of eating it. V 
eats the sandwich and dies because of a particularly violent allergic reaction. Such 
violent reactions from persons with V’s allergy are, for the sake of the example, rare. 
 
The intuition that School Dinner ought to be a case of involuntary manslaughter, rather than 
something else (which will not be held by everyone),128 cannot be enough itself to confirm 
RM’s existence as an independent head of manslaughter. This is particularly so given the doubts 
that have been cast above on the supposedly strongest supporting authorities. (It is important, 
here, that both Lidar and Hussain involved acts, rather than omissions.) Instead, examples such 
as School Dinner (if thought to merit a conviction for manslaughter), where GNM and UAM 
appear to be unavailable, may simply indicate the need to create, rather than show the present 
existence of, a separate head of involuntary manslaughter, RM, in contemporary English 
criminal law. 
Much also depends on how strong the serious and obvious risk of death constraint is in 
GNM. If the courts were to endorse something like the a fortiori argument mentioned above, it 
may be that advertent recklessness as to serious injury is simply a “higher” mens rea ingredient 
satisfying the “lesser” ingredient of gross negligence with regard to an obvious and serious risk 
of death, thus meaning that there is no need for a separate head of manslaughter (RM) to lead 
to a conviction in School Dinner. It would simply be GNM. The need for an obvious and serious 
“objectively” foreseeable risk of death would, if this argument were taken forward by the 
courts, be restricted to cases where the defendant lacked awareness of a risk of death or serious 
injury attendant upon her actions or omissions (which, in the circumstances, it was unjustified 
to take). 
In the light of the doctrinal discussion above, there is good reason to believe that there 
is no independent offence of RM in contemporary English criminal law: involuntary 
manslaughter is, after all, limited to UAM and GNM. The next section explains why this is a 
regrettable position to be in, even in cases where a prosecution for UAM or GNM could, unlike 
in School Dinner, definitely secure a conviction for manslaughter. 
 
Is There Any Need for Reckless Manslaughter? 
                                                
128 D’s culpability in School Dinner and Dirty Restaurant is higher than that of some defendants convicted of 
UAM, and perhaps some defendants convicted of GNM. This point is not determinative, though: UAM and GNM 
are renowned for being defined too broadly. 
  21 
There are three major problems raised by the current legal position, even where UAM and GNM 
could lead to a conviction for manslaughter. 
 
Labelling 
First, there is a problem of fair labelling, 129  insofar as the present law of involuntary 
manslaughter does not distinguish meaningfully between different types of culpability 
regarding the causing of death. In relation to UAM, the defendant’s culpability can be anything 
from acting in the face of foreseeable bodily injury to awareness of a very high risk of death. 
This is a shockingly broad range of culpability to be captured under one label, and the 
communicative impact of this route to a manslaughter conviction is minimal.  
With regard to GNM, the criminal law very rarely keeps recklessness and (any form of) 
negligence together in offence definitions, and it is submitted that this is because of the 
difference between advertent and inadvertent wrongdoing being taken, at least usually in non-
regulatory contexts, to be morally significant.130 Only a sketch of this difference can be offered 
here.131 Defendants’ choices are limited by their awareness: they cannot choose to take a risk 
of x if they were unaware that x was a possible consequence of their actions, or circumstance 
potentially surrounding it. If a defendant is aware of a relevant risk, she can choose to take it. 
That choice links the defendant particularly clearly with her risk-taking and its consequences, 
bridging the gap between the defendant, as an agent, and her wrongdoing that culpability is 
designed to cross. This is not to say that without awareness of risk there is no way to link 
defendants, as agents, with their risk-taking and the materialisation of those risks.132 It is merely 
to say that a choice-based model of culpability is particularly compelling in the context of the 
criminal law.133 
Inadvertent risk-taking is not choice-based, except in very peculiar situations where the 
defendant chooses to be inadvertent later.134 This means that in most instances of inadvertent 
risk-taking, the link between the defendant (as an agent), her risk-taking, and its consequences 
                                                
129 See B. Mitchell, “Further evidence of the relationship between legal and public opinion on the law of homicide” 
[2000] Crim. L.R. 814, 826. 
130 An exceptional case is rape, where the law endorses a negligence-type standard (the absence of a reasonable 
belief in consent) for all cases. 
131  See, F. Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), ch. 6. 
132 E.g. L. Alexander and K. Kessler Ferzan, Crime and Culpability: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch.3. 
133 See, further, A.P. Simester, “A disintegrated theory of culpability” in D. Baker and J. Horder (eds.), The Sanctity 
of Life and the Criminal Law: The Legacy of Glanville Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
p.178. 
134 cf. People v. Decina 2 NY 2d 133, 138 N.E. 2d (1956, N.Y.). 
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is less clear. The criminal law can be less sure of the grounds for blame, as there are various 
reasons why the risk could have been missed. Hence, inadvertent negligence – including 
inadvertent gross negligence – is (rightly) used more sparingly in the criminal law than 
advertent fault elements.135 
 It is problematic, from a labelling perspective, that this distinction in relative culpability 
is not reflected more explicitly in English criminal law’s offence of involuntary manslaughter, 
particularly where the comparison is between inadvertence and advertence regarding a risk of 
death. Outside that context, overlap is imaginable: gross negligence as to an obvious and serious 
risk of death is presumably, all other things being equal, “worse” in terms of culpability than 
awareness of a minimal (yet unjustified) risk of bodily harm.136 This could explain why the 
courts have, more clearly in modern judgments, focussed on awareness of a risk of at least 
serious injury. Perhaps some instances of gross negligence regarding the risk of death could be 
viewed as being “worse” than awareness of a real risk of serious bodily harm, which would 
have implications for both the courts’ existing approach and the a fortiori argument mentioned 
above (which, as has been noted, has never been adopted by the courts). It is nevertheless 
submitted that the view that it is typically more culpable to advertently risk serious bodily harm 
than it is to miss an obvious and serious risk of death is defensible, and could justify a distinction 
between such cases in the labelling of offences. 
A more refined category of involuntary manslaughter, separated from voluntary 
manslaughter, would be preferable – in terms of reflecting culpability – to the current mixing 
of recklessness with regard to death or serious injury with GNM and UAM. If the arguments 
above are accepted, however, it seems that the best that prosecutors can do is argue cases 
explicitly based on foresight of a risk of death or serious injury, and hope that sentencing 
reflects the defendant’s true culpability. 
A response to this argument is that, even if prosecutors were to try and draw a distinction 
between such advertence-based cases and other forms of involuntary manslaughter, the final 
label is always going to be manslaughter, an uninformative tag. There is good reason, on 
grounds of typical relative culpability, to mark more clearly the distinctions between voluntary 
and involuntary, constructive and non-constructive,137 and reckless and (grossly) negligent 
                                                
135  See F. Stark, Culpable Carelessness: Recklessness and Negligence in the Criminal Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp.260-266. 
136 A. Ashworth, “Manslaughter: general or nominate offences?” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal 
Liability for Non-aggressive Death (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp.236-237.  
137 For a more adventurous argument about labeling and UAM, see B. Mitchell, “More thoughts about unlawful 
and dangerous act manslaughter and the one-punch killer” [2009] Crim. L.R. 502, 509-511. 
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killing. Those distinctions would be marked most helpfully through different offences, rather 
than merely different modes of commission.138 The Law Commission proposed in 1996 for a 
new offence of “reckless killing” (dependant on awareness of a risk of causing death or serious 
injury) to sit alongside “killing by gross carelessness” (in essence, a firmer version of GNM), 
whilst UAM would be abolished.139 These proposals had much to commend them, but it is 
highly unlikely that they will be taken forward, despite their benefits in terms of labelling.140 
This is regrettable. 
 
Sentencing 
A second benefit of marking out a distinct head of manslaughter based on recklessness as to the 
risk of death or serious bodily harm would be in terms of sentencing.  
Presently, sentences for GNM are higher where (presumably “subjective”) recklessness 
regarding death or serious bodily injury is averred and proved.141 The difficulty is that this 
sentencing regime is tremendously fragile if the substantive law of manslaughter remains as it 
is. In Current Sentencing Practice, for instance, there was (until the most recent edition) a 
separate section on “reckless manslaughter”, but virtually every case in it is formally a GNM 
case.142 Without requiring, in every judicial direction given in a relevant case, a formal finding 
that advertent recklessness regarding death or serious bodily harm was present, the sentencing 
court will have to go by inference to establish whether such awareness existed and whether the 
                                                
138 M. Wasik, “Sentencing in homicide” in A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell (eds.), Rethinking English Homicide Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.187-190; C.M.V. Clarkson, “Context and culpability in involuntary 
manslaughter: principle or instinct?” in the same volume, pp.141-145. A. Ashworth, “Manslaughter: general or 
nominate offences?” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal Liability for Non-aggressive Death 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp.242-247. 
139 Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com. No.237, 1996). Previous Law Commission proposals would have seen 
the abolition of gross negligence manslaughter: e.g. A Criminal Code for England and Wales (Law Com. No.177, 
1989), cl. 55. 
140 The Commission’s proposals in 2006 pushed voluntary manslaughter into (second degree) murder, some cases 
of RM into first-degree murder (where the defendant intended to do serious injury and was aware of a serious risk 
of causing death: Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com. No.304, 2006), paras.2.50-2.69) others into 
second-degree murder (where the defendant intended to cause injury or fear of injury, aware of the serious risk of 
causing death: paras.2.95-2.116), and maintained an undifferentiated offence of manslaughter. From a labelling 
perspective, these proposals do not solve the problem with involuntary manslaughter. 
141  See the sample in C.M.V. Clarkson, “Context and culpability in involuntary manslaughter: principle or 
instinct?” in A. Ashworth and B. Mitchell (eds.), Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), p.163. See, too: Johnson [2008] EWCA Crim 2976, [2009] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 28 at [11]. An intention 
to cause some harm is also an aggravation: Bowler [2015] EWCA Crim 849, [2015] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 38 at [18]. 
142 L. Harris (ed.), Current Sentencing Practice (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), para.B1-3.3G et seq. The 
exception was Hussain [2012] EWCA Crim 188, [2012] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 75, explained above. The 2017 edition 
does not recognise RM as a separate category. Archbold considers “reckless” manslaughter in its section on “gross 
negligence manslaughter”, and makes clear that there is no major conceptual distance between them: P.J. 
Richardson (ed.), Archbold: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 2017 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2017) 
paras.19.123-19.124. 
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offence was, accordingly, aggravated. The same is true of cases of UAM, where sometimes no 
awareness of any risk of death or serious injury will be consistent with a conviction. 
Granted, the trial judge will have heard all the evidence that the jury was presented with 
or know the factual basis of the defendant’s plea. It might, then, be thought that she will 
presumably be able to come to a sensible judgment about whether the defendant was aware of 
the risk of death or grievous bodily harm. An additional offence “box”, with the same maximum 
sentence (life imprisonment) might thus be thought unnecessary. There are two responses 
available. First, it is not normal for juries to get judges, through their verdicts, into such a rough 
ballpark, after which the trial judge exercises such wide-ranging discretion over sentencing. Of 
course, intention and recklessness are discrete forms of mens rea for a host of crimes, and yet 
the jury does not make clear whether it thought the defendant intended or was reckless as to the 
elements of the actus reus.143 But the difference between intention and recklessness is more 
pronounced, and more readily inferable by a trial judge, than the distinction between inadvertent 
and advertent unjustified risk-taking with regard to death or serious injury. Secondly, it seems 
very unlikely that the basis of plea, or the jury’s verdict, will tell the trial judge everything she 
needs to know in order to assess the question of awareness of risk.144 
It would be far more transparent, and hopefully more consistent, if trial judges were 
given a steer by the jury (or in the factual basis of the plea) on the question of whether the 
defendant was aware of the risk of death or serious bodily harm. The creation of a clear and 
consistent distinction (at least in prosecution approach) between such cases of advertence and 
other cases of UAM and GNM could be encouraged through sentencing guidelines making 
clear that awareness of such risks impacts substantially on the sentencing range and will have 
to be proved expressly to the satisfaction of the jury.  
The Sentencing Council’s present proposals will not achieve this end.145 The Council 
(correctly, if the arguments in this article are accepted) does not identify RM as a separate 
species of involuntary manslaughter, and so the draft guidelines consider awareness of risk 
under the umbrellas of GNM and UAM only. Awareness of a “clear” risk of death would 
indicate high culpability in GNM, whilst unawareness of the same – presumably including 
foresight of a risk of serious injury (presently recognised as an aggravating factor) – would be 
                                                
143 It is of course open to (but not mandatory for) the prosecution to allege intention and recklessness in respect of 
different counts on the indictment. 
144 This is, of course, not a problem limited to the context of manslaughter, and does suggest that theoretical 
niceties in the assessment of culpability must sometimes be missed in practice. 
145 Manslaughter Guideline Consultation (Sentencing Council, 2017). 
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an indicator of lower culpability.146 Sentencing judges would thus have to be even more fine-
grained in their assessments of the defendant’s foresight of risk (with no additional help from 
the jury) than at present. This will be no easy task. In relation to UAM, an indicator of high 
culpability would be that “death was caused in the course of an unlawful act which carried a 
high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender”.147 There 
is no formal distinction between cases of advertent taking of these risks and inadvertent taking 
of those risks in terms of the assessment of culpability. The proposals will thus not make it 
more attractive for prosecutors to nail their colours to the mast in cases where they believe the 
defendant was aware of the risk of death or serious injury involved in her act or omission. 
A second benefit to separating out cases involving awareness of a risk of death or serious 
injury concerns combatting the gradual creep in sentences for all homicide offences.148 The 
view has been taken by the Court of Appeal that the increased starting points (and overall 
sentences) for murder contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and an increased legislative 
focus on harm (i.e. death)149 justify higher sentencing for UAM150 and GNM.151 The overall 
result has been a rise in sentences for both murder and manslaughter, and it is not inconceivable 
that a rise in the tariffs for murder could, once more, increase the severity of manslaughter 
sentences globally. The difficulty with this pegged approach is that the heads of manslaughter 
cover a large range of wrongdoing and culpability, 152  and it is highly questionable that 
sentencing for murder is, once the fact of death has been accounted for, relevant to all of it. The 
cases where sentences for murder should, presumably, matter most are where there is some 
correlation between the defendant’s culpability and the culpability required for murder. There 
does appear to be good reason to tie the sentencing in manslaughter cases where there is a risk 
of death or serious bodily harm to the sentences available in murder cases.153  Typically, 
however, cases of UAM and GNM are relatively far removed from murder in terms of 
culpability (though of course they involve the same basic harm of death).154 There is reason, 
                                                
146 At 24. 
147 At 15. 
148 See Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 6th edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 
pp.128-134; H. Quirk, “Sentencing white coat crime: the need for guidance in medical manslaughter cases” [2013] 
Crim. L.R. 871, 874-878. 
149 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s. 143(1). 
150 E.g. Appleby [2009] EWCA Crim 2693, [2010] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 46. 
151 E.g. Holtom [2010] EWCA Crim 934, [2011] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 18 at [19]; Barrass [2011] EWCA Crim 2629, 
[2012] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 80 at [15]; Garg [2013] EWCA Crim 2520, [2013] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 30 at [45].  
152 E.g. Folkes [2011] EWCA Crim 325, [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 76 at [15]. 
153 Cf. Huggins [2016] EWCA Crim 1715, [2017] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 21. I am grateful to David Ormerod QC for 
mentioning this case to me. 
154 Some cases are not, of course – Hussain [2004] EWCA Crim 763, [2004] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 93. The possibility 
that focusing just on the harm of death is conceivably too narrow an approach is left open here. 
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then, to have a far higher sentencing band for the cases that are assumed by some to be cases 
of RM than for UAM and GNM. Even if the maximum sentence is always life imprisonment, 
these bands can help mark important differences in culpability more clearly and consistently 
than the existing or Council-proposed sentencing regimes. 
Rather than recognise this broad culpability hierarchy haphazardly by considering 
awareness of the risk of death or serious bodily harm (rarely stated as a necessary ingredient of 
liability in judicial directions) as an aggravation of one of those other forms of involuntary 
manslaughter, the existence of an independent head of RM could ensure much more clarity, 
transparency and consistency in sentencing. Again, the clearest route forwards would be to 
legislate to reform the area of manslaughter (and homicide in general). 
 
The Reach of Manslaughter 
The third benefit in recognising RM as a meaningfully distinct form of homicide concerns the 
overall fairness of the law of murder and manslaughter under English law. Some people 
convicted of UAM were aware of a risk of death or serious injury that in the circumstances was 
unjustified to take. Such defendants are not the ones that critics of the law of UAM are usually 
concerned about. They are concerned with defendants who have committed property offences 
or minor offences related to violence, unaware of the risk of death or serious injury, in 
circumstances where there is an obvious risk of “some injury” occurring and death results.155 
Similarly, some people convicted of GNM will have been aware of the deadly 
consequences of their actions, and thus demonstrate more clearly their insufficient concern for 
the lives of others. Nobody doubts that manslaughter convictions are appropriate in such 
circumstances. Those aware of a risk of serious harm are also (though more controversially) 
deserving of significant censure in relation to the causing of death. Yet, other defendants will 
have been oblivious to the risk of death in circumstances of extreme pressure and anxiety that 
might unsettle a finding of clear culpability (think of the defendant in Adomako),156 but still be 
bad enough to amount to gross negligence. Those cases are more difficult and controversial. 
There is a place for (gross) negligence in the law of homicide, but the current approach is 
insufficiently nuanced.157 
                                                
155 E.g. B. Mitchell, “Minding the gap in unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter: a moral defence for one-punch 
killers” (2008) 72 J. Crim. L. 537. 
156 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.84-85. 
157 cf. V. Tadros, “The limits of manslaughter” in C.M.V. and S. Cunningham (eds.), Criminal Liability for Non-
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If cases where the defendant was aware of a risk of death or serious bodily harm, and 
took it without justification (i.e. RM), were not triable only as instances of (very bad) UAM 
and GNM, they would not be able to lend respectability to offences that can convict persons of 
manslaughter in these extremely controversial circumstances. In removing that veneer, those 
controversies would be even more apparent and less easy to live with, prompting the reforms 
that GNM and UAM so desperately require. 
  
Conclusion 
It has been argued at length that there is good reason to doubt that, as a matter of doctrinal law, 
there exists a separate head of RM in modern English criminal law. The more plausible account 
of the law is that awareness of a risk of death or serious injury, which it is unjustified to take in 
the circumstances, is simply a factor for consideration in a case of UAM or GNM, and an 
aggravating (and, it is submitted, unclear) factor at sentencing. This position is unsatisfactory 
from the perspectives of fair labelling, fair sentencing and fairness generally in the law of 
manslaughter. The best solution to this problem would be to have separate, clearly-defined 
offences of RM, GNM and UAM. An alternative (but far inferior) solution is for the prosecution 
to nail their colours to the mast and setting out to prove awareness of the relevant risk(s) in 
cases of GNM and UAM. The practical need to do so to secure appropriately tougher sentences 
is weak at present, and the Sentencing Council’s proposed guidelines are unlikely to change 
matters drastically. It seems that the current, confused legal position is unlikely to be clarified 
soon. 
Cases that can be brought under UAM and GNM are, at least, clearly manslaughter. Far 
more difficult to resolve are examples such as School Dinner, where the defendant falls into the 
gaps in both UAM and GNM, and there is – it has been contended – no firm basis for concluding 
that a manslaughter conviction is properly returnable under the existing law. The culpability of 
such defendants is undeniably clearer than in some cases of UAM and GNM, and yet there is 
real room for doubt that they are guilty of a homicide offence. Surely such an unclear legal 
position ought to be a cause for embarrassment, and make the already indisputable case for 
wholesale legislative reform of the law of homicide even stronger. 
